The Key Factors of Transparency of the Public Procurement in the Czech Republic  by Man, Petr et al.
 Procedia Economics and Finance  12 ( 2014 )  379 – 386 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
2212-5671 © 2014 Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ECE 2014
doi: 10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00358-X 
ScienceDirect
Enterprise and the Competitive Environment 2014 conference, ECE 2014, 6–7 March 2014, Brno, 
Czech Republic 
The key factors of transparency of the public procurement in the 
Czech Republic 
Petr Mana,*, Jitka Matějkováa, Radek Jurčíka, Rudolf Heidua 
a Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Law and Social Sciences, Mendel University In Brno, Zemědělská 1, 613 00, Czech Republic 
 
Abstract 
This contribution describes factors influencing the efficiency of placing public procurements, in compliance with the Public 
Procurement Act, in the Czech Republic. Transaction expenses, being spent by the candidates as well the contracting authorities, 
have been identified as one of the important influences.  
The authors present results based on a quantitative analysis of a selected sample of candidates of public procurements placed by 
contracting authorities originating from a random selection from the Journal of procurement. A regression level has been 
calculated, describing the dependency on price differences and the type of procurement procedure. By using Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient a slight positive dependency between the number of submitted offers in the procurement procedure and the 
price difference (defined as the difference between the expected value of a public procurement and the winning bid of the given 
tender) have been found.  
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1. Objectives 
The economic significance of public procurement in Europe is considerable, with yearly purchasing valued at 3.5 
percent of the region’s GDP1. The aim of this study is to analyse an effectiveness of the public procurement through 
defining transaction costs. The study is prepared in the context of a comprehensive evaluation of transparency of 
public procurement procedure and to help possible improvement of future procurement policy. 
In the first part of the report, there is presented a definition of a transaction cost and are described circumstances 
of public procurement transaction costs. Furthermore, in the paper there would be recognized various procedures 
and techniques (across countries, over time, and in sectors), that can influence the costs and effectiveness of 
administration and participation in selected tender procedures foreseen by Czech legislation in comparison to 
European Union procurement legislation.  
1.1. Definition of transaction costs 
A transaction cost can be defined as the cost connected with interchange of goods or services and sustained in 
overcoming market imperfections. Transaction costs are generally represented by communication charges, legal 
fees, informational cost of finding the price, quality, and durability, etc., and may also include transportation costs. 
Transaction costs are a critical factor in deciding whether to make a product or buy it2.   
Transaction costs can be divided into three broad categories3: Search and information costs are charges for 
defining required availability of goods on the market, or for example which of goods has the lowest price. 
Negotiating costs are the costs essential to come to an acceptable agreement with the other party to the 
transaction, to draw up an appropriate deal. On asset markets and in market microstructure, the transaction cost is 
some utility of the distance between the bids and inquires.  
Policing and enforcement costs are the costs of ensuring the contractor to fulfil the terms of the agreement, and to 
take an appropriate legal action if this turns out not to be the case.  
A uniform definition of transaction costs does not seem to exist. For example, Arrow4 defines the transaction 
costs as the cost of operation economic system, i. e. running the economic system. Transaction costs are all costs 
that are associated with the implementation of the contract, without producing costs; without transaction costs the 
transaction cannot be concluded and vice versa without the transaction does not exist transaction costs5. Transaction 
costs can be also defined more specifically as costs arising in the ex-ante (in particular the preparation and 
planning), during and ex post (monitoring and verification) procurement procedure. 
The transaction costs from the economic point of view were introduced by the institutional economist John R. 
Commons6. He said that … “These individual actions are really trans-actions instead of either individual behaviour 
or the “exchange” of commodities. It is this shift from commodities and individuals to transactions and working 
rules of collective action that marks the transition from the classical and hedonic schools to the institutional schools 
of economic thinking. But the smallest unit of the institutional economists is a unit of activity – a transaction, with 
its participants. Transactions intervene between the labour of the classic economists and the pleasures of the hedonic 
 
 
1 Public procurement in Europe (2011) Cost and effectiveness. In: European Commission - The EU Single Market: Evaluation of public 
procurement rules [online]. London: London Economics and Ecorys, March 2011, 1.2.2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/costeffectiveness_ en.pdf ), p. 4 
2 In BusinessDictionary.com, 24.2.2014, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/transaction-cost.html#ixzz2skAMEoSC  
3 Dahlman, Carl J. (1979) The Problem of Externality. Journal of Law and Economics 22 (1): 141–162. ISSN 0022-2186. „These, then, 
represent the first approximation to a workable concept of transaction costs: search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing 
and enforcement costs.“  
4 Arrow, Kenneth J. (1969) The organization of economic activity: issues pertinent to the choice of market versus nonmarket allocation. In 
The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: the PBB System, Joint Economic Committee Compendium, 91st Congress, 1st Section, Vol. 
1. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.  
5 Pavel, J. (2005): Ekonomické aspekty zadávání veřejných zakázek, kapitola v publikaci Veřejné zakázky v České republice: korupce nebo 
transparentnost?, Transparency International Česká republika 
6 John R. Commons (1931), Institutional Economics, American Economic Review, Vol.21, pp.648–657  
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economists, simply because it is society that controls access to the forces of nature, and transactions are, not the 
“exchange of commodities”, but the alienation and acquisition, between individuals, of the rights of property and 
liberty created by society, which must therefore be negotiated between the parties concerned before labour can 
produce, or consumers can consume, or commodities be physically exchanged.”  
The term “transaction cost” is generally thought to have been invented by Ronald Coase7, who used it to develop 
a theoretical framework for predicting when certain economic tasks are performed by firms, and when they are 
performed on the market. However, the term is actually absent from his early work up to the 1970s. While he did not 
invent the specific term, Coase indeed discussed “costs of using the price mechanism” in his 1937 paper “The 
Nature of the Firm”, where he firstly discussed the concept of transaction costs, and refered to the “Costs of Market 
Transactions” in his seminar work “The Problem of Social Cost”.  
At present, transaction cost is used to explain a number of different behaviours. This often involves considering 
“transactions” as not only the obvious cases of buying and selling, but also day-to-day emotional interactions, 
informal gift exchanges, etc. Oliver E. Williamson, awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics8,  determines 
transaction costs as frequency, specificity, uncertainty, limited rationality, and opportunistic behaviour.  
Transaction costs have been also defined by Steven N. S. Cheung as any costs that arise due to the existence of 
institutions, they should be more properly called “institutional costs”. 9   
1.2. Transaction cost in Public Procurement 
Effectiveness is the main objective of the institute of public procurement and should be managed by providing 
better services to the public at a lower price than it is possible to achieve by the public sector. 
The effectiveness is dependent on the type of production. Many economists then raise the question about 
institutions, i. e. corporations, markets, franchises, etc., minimize the transaction costs of producing and distributing 
a particular good or service, and the response tend to specific of a contract involved.  
1.3. Techniques of public procurement transaction cost measurement 
Pavel10 in 2005 suggests analysing questions of transaction costs in procurement by institutional economics 
theory. It is based on three main assumptions; first of all “bounded rationality”, which means that imperfect 
contracts are due to the limited rationality of individuals, and these agreements suffer from necessity of additional 
costs (ex-ante and ex post). “Existence of opportunism” means that benefits extension may be carried out by using 
methods that are not entirely moral, and in some cases even not legal. Protection against the practice brings 
additional costs (ex-ante and ex post). The “existence of specific assets” is mentioned as the last one. 
Comparably, Williamson11 said, that the amount of transaction costs which is relevant when deciding on ways 
how to ensure certain activities is influenced by three factors: specific activities, measurability of output and input 
frequencies. 
The above described assumptions have serious implications for the analysis of the relationship between 
government and market actors in the implementation of public procurement.  
The key assumption for the “rational” decision-making of public entities is the ability to realize the contracted 
goods and further quantify or at least estimate the size of the transaction costs associated with the implementation of 
the contract. 
 
 
7 Coase, Ronald (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44. doi:10.1086/466560  
8 Williamson, Oliver E. (1981). The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, The American Journal of Sociology, 87(3), 
pp. 548-577  
9 Steven N. S. Cheung „On the New Institutional Economics“, Contract Economics, L. Werin and H. Wijkander (eds.), Basil Blackwell, 1992, 
pp. 48-65  
10 Pavel, J. (2005): Ekonomické aspekty zadávání veřejných zakázek, kapitola v publikaci Veřejné zakázky v České republice: korupce nebo 
transparentnost?, Transparency International Česká republika 
11 Williamson, O. (1981): The Economics of Organization, American Journal of Sociology 
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The question of measuring the amount of transaction costs is tricky. The problem is that these costs are not in 
most cases evident12, mostly are not defined separately (in many cases there is a period of savings of scale). 
In measuring the value of transaction cost in public procurement it is necessary to realize that there have not been 
only the public authorities with their costs but also the private sector. It is therefore important to recognize that in 
order to achieve maximum effectiveness, it is necessary to ensure minimizing both types of transaction costs, not 
only the public sector transaction costs.13 
Pavel gives examples of transaction costs related to procurement. Transaction costs in public sector are connected 
with organisation and administration of public, competitions, compensation of independent experts, legal knowhow 
of contracts, public tender re-establishing, costs arising from the delay in the implementation of public contracts, 
and lawsuit. In private sector, we can define processing applications, obtaining a qualification requirement, security 
deposit, and lawsuit.14 
Transaction costs regarding to the public procurement in public sector are estimated around 1.8 % of the contract 
value. For example Walsh – Davis15 estimate that these costs are limited to the ex-ante cost and do not cover 
monitoring and eventual bargaining activities. Conversely, the costs associated with monitoring were quantified by 
Audit Commission16 and is estimated at 3–4 % of the contract value. 
In the Czech Republic, there has not been made any underlying attempt to measure the transaction costs in the 
area of public procurement; and it is the intention of the authors to research the issue as a part of the thesis. 
Though, one of the kind of measurements of transaction costs connected to tax system presented Pudil et al.17  
The methods used in this study may obviously be used after appropriate adjustments, even in the case of public 
procurement.  However, this approach will not be useful for estimating the ex post transactional costs arising due to 
non-compliance with the concluded contracts, because there will not be periodic tasks.  
The largest positive economic work published until now focusing on transaction cost of public procurement in 
European Union is a study prepared for the European Commission in March 2011.18 Especially the second part of 
this paper introduces transaction cost analysis based on data from more than half a million of purchases published 
during TED for 30 countries in the years 2006–2010. Another source of data was a survey between 5500 and 1800 
to the contracting authority suppliers. The study19 shows that there are significant differences among EU countries. 
Transaction costs in the Czech Republic are below average. The most important factor will be the labour cost, which 
is not still as high as in Western Europe. 
Total cost of public procurement in Europe is estimated at about 1,4 percent of purchasing volume. This equates 
to about 5.3 billion euro in 2009 terms20. Businesses account for 75 percent of these costs. Although the unit costs 
for developing a request and managing the process are higher for authorities, the fact that several bids are prepared 
 
 
12 Měřičková, B. - Šebo, J. - Vidličková, K. (2005): Financný manažment vo verejnom sektore - teória a prax v krajinách EÚ. Banská 
Bystrica : Ekonomická fakulta UMB 
13 Pavel, J. (2004): Vliv transakčních nákladů na zabezpečování veřejných služeb. Brno 22.01.2004–23.01.2004. In: Mech, Josef (ed.). 
Konkurence ve veřejném sektoru. Sborník referátu z teoretického semináře pořádaného ESF MU v Brně. Brno : Masarykova univerzita 
14 Pavel, J. (2004): Vliv transakčních nákladu na zabezpečování veřejných služeb. Brno 22.01.2004–23.01.2004. In: Mech, Josef (ed.). 
Konkurence ve veřejném sektoru. Sborník referátu z teoretického semináře pořádaného ESF MU v Brně. Brno : Masarykova univerzita 
15 Walsh, K. – Davis, H. (1993): Competition and services: The impact of the Local Government Act 1988, Department of the Environment, 
University of Birmingham, HMSO, United Kingdom 
16 Audit Commission (1995): Making markets: A review of the audits of the client role for 
contracted services, Bulletin, March, London, HMSO 
17 Pudil, P. - Vybíhal, V. - Vítek, L. - Pavel, J. – a kol., (2004): Zdanění a efektivnost. 1. vyd. Praha: Eurolex Bohemia 
18 Public procurement in Europe (2011): Cost and effectiveness. In: European Commission – The EU Single Market: Evaluation of public 
procurement rules [online]. London: London Economics and Ecorys, March 2011, 11.2.2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/costeffectiveness_ en.pdf ) 
19 Public procurement in Europe (2011): Cost and effectiveness. In: European Commission – The EU Single Market: Evaluation of public 
procurement rules [online]. London: London Economics and Ecorys, March 2011 citovano.11.2.2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/costeffectiveness_en.pdf ) 
20 Public procurement in Europe (2011): Cost and effectiveness. In: European Commission – The EU Single Market: Evaluation of public 
procurement rules [online]. London: London Economics and Ecorys, March 2011 citovano.11.2.2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/costeffectiveness_en.pdf ), p. 6 
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and submitted for each tender explains the higher total costs for suppliers. The average competition uses the 
equivalent of 123 person days of resources21; in monetary terms this equates to 28.ooo euro. 
There is much difference in cost effectiveness between countries. For example, in Germany and Norway the 
process cost of procurement reaches above 4 percent of total procurement volume, while in the UK and Italy the 
share is less than 1 percent. 
1.4. Other factors influencing transparency  
Working on the assumption that a sufficient extent of competition on the offering side is a condition for an 
efficiently working public procurement system and being able to estimate the average number of submitted offers of 
such a procurement procedure then a sufficient number of offers makes it possible, due to the existence of a 
competition effect (inversely proportional relation between the number of submitted offers and the tendered price), 
to achieve favourable prices for the contracting authority. 
In order to be able to describe the possible dependency of selected parameters influencing the intensity of 
tenders, we have carried out a quantitative analysis of secondary data acquired from the Journal of procurement 
containing 197 procurement procedures. Individual data have been selected randomly and acquired from published 
Contract notices and Contract award notices, by selecting following tenders conditions 
x Open procedure 
x Restricted procedure 
The reason to narrow the selection to two types of procurement procedures was their high share of the total 
number and of the total financial value of public procedures in the Czech Republic (Table No. 1). Data from 
negotiated procedures without publication have intentionally not been used, even though their share on the total 
number is higher than in the case of restricted procedures, because it is the character of such procedure to only have 
one offer.   
 Table 1. Structure of procurement procedures in the Czech Republic (selection) 
2011 % from total 
procurement 
procedures 
% from total 
financial value of 
public contracts 
Public procedure 43.8 65.1 
Restricted procedure 4.9 14.3 
MMR, Annual report on the state of public contracts in the Czech Republic, May 2012 
 
 
By using a regression function, the authors have attempted to estimate the regression level coefficient expressed 
by a linear regression function (Marek, L. and coll. 2013) Y=ß0+ß1X1+ß2X2+ß3X3+Ɛ, where  
Y … is the explained value (dependent variable) 
X1 … Xn are values explaining the variables 
Ɛ … is an unsystematic (random) element 
 
 
 
21 Public procurement in Europe (2011): Cost and effectiveness. In: European Commission – The EU Single Market: Evaluation of public 
procurement rules [online]. London: London Economics and Ecorys, March 2011 citovano. 11.2.2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/costeffectiveness_en.pdf )  
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Because we are interested in the possible influence of explaining variables, specifically the type of procurement 
procedure (X1 … as open and restricted), number of offers in procurement procedure (X2) and the estimated value of 
the public procurement (X3), on the explained variable defined as the difference between the estimated value of the 
public procurement and the tendered price offered by the winning candidate (Y), we have included the before 
mentioned variables into the model (model No. 1). We have calculated the following values: 
Table 2. Regression statistics of model No. 1 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.931354275 
Reliability value R 0.867420786 
Given reliability R 0.865359969 
Standard error 11868694.78 
Observation 197 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Table 3. Anova model No. 1  
  Difference SS MS F Importance F 
Regression 3 1.77876E+17 5.9292E+16 420.9111569 2.1614E-84 
Residue 193 2.71871E+16 1.40866E+14 
Total 196 2.05063E+17       
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The adjusted coefficient of determination R2 = 86.7 implies that it is possible to explain 87 % of the variability of 
values of the explained variable thanks to this regression model.  
We used the F-test for a complex evaluation of the mode. The tested hypothesis contains a claim that all 
regression parameters ßj (j=1 …, k) are, expect for the ß0 constant, equal to zero, i.e. the model does not contain any 
explaining Xj variable, which is statistically important.  
  
H0: ß0 = c; ß1= ß2= … ßk=0 
H1: non H0 
 
It is obvious from Table 3 that the P-value of the F-test is 2.1614E-84 < α = 0.05, so we can dismiss the zero 
hypothesis about an improper model. 
We continued with partial t-tests, mainly the hypothesis test regarding the ß0 parameter and parameters ß1, ß2 and 
ß3. Based on the calculated reliability intervals, we reject the tested hypothesis for ß0, ß1 and ß2. However, the 
reliability interval for the partial ß3 t-test contains zero. We do not reject the zero hypothesis (H0: ß3 = 0; H1: ß3 ≠ 0).  
We will try to improve the described model in the next step and we will exclude the explaining X2 variable. In 
this case we will receive the following parameters (model No. 2). 
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Table 4. Regression statistics of model No. 2. 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.930829354 
Reliability value R 0.866443287 
Given reliability R 0.865066414 
Standard error 11881626.37 
Observation 197 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 Table 5. Anova model No. 2. 
  Difference SS MS F Importance F 
Regression 2 1.77676E+17 8.88378E+16 629.2832227 1.5473E-85 
Residue 194 2.73876E+16 1.41173E+14 
Total 196 2.05063E+17       
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Thanks to the adjusted coefficient of determination R2 = 86.5, we are able to see that it is possible to explain 86% 
of the variability of values of the explained variable thanks to this regression model. In comparison with model No. 
1 this value has changed minimally, thus we can continue considering the use of such model. 
As well as for the P-value of the F-test being 1.5473E -84 < α = 0.05, we can dismiss the zero hypothesis about 
an improper model. 
After finishing partial t-tests (hypothesis test of parameter ß0 and parameters ß1 and ß2), it is possible to state that 
the constant as well as both explaining variables of the procurement procedure type (X1) and the estimated value 
(X2) contribute to explain the model.   
The regression level has the following form: Price difference = −9178287.082 + 8900448.76 * type of procedure 
+ 0.394208136 * estimated value. If the procedure is restricted then the equation implies that the price difference 
will decrease, meaning a higher achieved tendered price in comparison to its estimated value (in this case ß1 is equal 
to 0).   
1.5. Intensity dependence of selected variables 
The authors have pursued to determine the level of dependency of selected variables. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient (r) has been used to determine the relation’s dependency intensity. 
A positive correlation of r = 0.171582 was measured from secondary data for the dependence of the number of 
submitted offers in a procurement procedure and the price difference (defined as the difference between the 
expected value of a public procurement and the winning bid of a candidate). Due to the positive value and the 
amount of r, we can talk about a weak dependency (r has an interval of <−1, 1> and, in this case, does not reach 
limit values). A possible interpretation could be: the increase of the number of offers has a weak positive influence 
on the price difference.  
2. Conclusion 
The public procurement is the issue of professional economic debates; it is difficult to understand the prevailing 
neoclassical microeconomic apparatus, and therefore it is necessary to start supplementing economic instruments of 
transaction costs. 
The above mentioned theoretical aspects are introduction to the next paper – the research how to determine these 
costs and identify factors that interact. This would allow dividing the goods and services in terms of whether they 
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are suitable or unsuitable for outsourcing. The next step and also more problematic would be the quantification of 
these costs. It is necessary to focus on their decomposition and determine which aspects of the institutional setting 
the transaction costs increase. On the basis of results will be relevant to formulate economic policy 
recommendations for reform of formal and informal institutions. This should have a positive impact on the 
effectiveness of public procurement as well as for the overall efficiency. 
Also, the above stated findings gained from the study of the given issue and conducted analysis represents a 
fundamental platform for further scientific work. Measuring has discovered the dependence of the price difference 
on the type of procurement procedure, and the positive dependency between the number of submitted offers in a 
procurement procedure and the price difference.  However, due to the fact that the analysis is based on a relatively 
small sample of data, the authors of this article consider to verify and expand their conclusions through further and 
more extensive measuring.     
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